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Interest in studying law has grown dramatically in Russia since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. When high school students are surveyed about 
their future, becoming a lawyer (iurist) is typically one of the top choices.1 
Law students now make up about 10% of all university students,2 compared 
with 2% of this population in the Soviet era.3 Yet we know remarkably little 
about Russian law students. To date, the literature has focused primarily on 
institutional reforms to Russian legal education.4 These changes have been 
far reaching, both in quantity and quality. In the Soviet era, higher education 
was fully subsidized by the state. In the mid-1980s, there were about fifty 
institutions where young people could study law (law fakul’tety, or faculties).5 
1. E.L. Vozneseskaia, Molodezh’ i professii, in Novye smysly v obrazovatel’Nykh strategiiakh 
molodezhi: 50 let issledovaNiia 140 (D.L. Konstantinovskiy ed., 2015). 
2. Ekaterina Moiseeva, Iuridicheskoe obrazovanie v Rossii: Analiz kolichestvennykh dannykh (2016), http://
enforce.spb.ru/images/Nauchnie_raboty/2015_analit_obzor_Jurid_obrazovanie.pdf 
[hereinafter Moiseeva].
3. NarodNoe khoziaistvo sssr za 70 let: iubeleiNyi statisticheskii ezhegodNik 544-45 
(1987). 
4. E.g., Dmitry Maleshin, The Crisis of Russian Legal Education in Comparative Perspective, 66 J. 
legal educ. 289 (2017); Peter b. maggs et al., law aNd legal system of the russiaN 
federatioN 179-88 (6th ed. 2015); Olga Shepeleva & Asmik Novikova, The Quality of Legal 
Education in Russia: The Stereotypes and the Real Problems, 2 russiaN legal J. 106 (2014); Peter 
J. Sahlas & Carl Chastenay, Russian Legal Education: Post-Communist Stagnation or Revival?, 48 J. 
legal educ. 194 (1998); Lisa A. Granik, Legal Education in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine, 72 
or. l. rev. 963 (1993). Cf. david h. lemPert, daily life iN a crumbliNg emPire: the 
absorPtioN of russia iNto the world ecoNomy (1996) (ethnography of the daily lives of 
students at the law faculty of St. Petersburg State University in the early 1990s).
5. Susan Finder, Legal Education in the Soviet Union, 15 rev. socialist l. 197, 204-05 (1989). The 
names varied. Some were law departments or fakul’tety within larger universities and some 
were stand-alone institutes that taught only law. This differentiation in names continued in 
the post-Soviet era. To simplify the presentation, I refer to all of them as “law faculties.”
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Admission was highly competitive, with about forty applicants for every seat.6 
Post-Soviet Russia’s transition from an administrative-command system to a 
market economy opened the door for profit-seeking entrepreneurs to remake 
the legal educational landscape. They increased the number of students in 
the existing law schools and charged tuition to these additional students. 
At the same time, universities and other educational institutions that had 
previously shown no interest in training legal specialists saw the potential to 
make money and quickly established law faculties that were sustained solely 
through tuition. In fairly short order, private actors took advantage of the lax 
regulatory environment and began to set up law faculties, which were also 
tuition-based.7 By 2017, estimates of the number of law faculties ranged as high 
as 1200.8 The oversight of legal education in Russia is spotty, especially among 
private facilities. As a result, as others have documented, the quality of legal 
education provided varies widely.9 
In this article, I shift the focus away from the law faculties to the students 
themselves. Based on the results of a survey of 2016 Russian law graduates I 
explore three basic questions: (1) who studies law in Russia and why; (2) what 
experiences they have as law students; and (3) what attitudes these students 
have toward the Russian legal system and state more generally. For each 
question I analyze the extent to which the answers differ based on whether the 
respondent studied law on a full-time basis (“full-time students”) or studied 
law through correspondence, which in Russian is known as zaochnoe education 
(“correspondence students” or zaochniki).10 
Full-time and correspondence students turn out to be remarkably different. 
Full-time students tend to come from more financially comfortable and well-
educated parents. They are younger, typically matriculating directly upon 
graduation from secondary school. Correspondence students are older, and 
most are workplace veterans. They are also more likely to have secured a 
job upon graduation. Yet these two seemingly disparate groups share some 
commonalities. Their basic attitudes about the role of law are similar. Neither 
6. E. Mishina, Mnogolikie Rossiiskie Iuristy, in kakogo eto——byt’ iuristom? 6 (2010). 
7. See generally maggs et al., supra note 4, at 184-85.
8. Maleshin, supra note 4, at 297; see Dmitrii V. Mazaev, Uchastie rabotodatelei v sisteme vysshego 
iuridicheskogo obrazovaniia i v podgotovki iuristov, zakoN, no. 11 at 59, 61-62 (2016). This increase in 
the supply of institutions of higher education and decrease in overall quality is not limited to 
the field of law. See generally Olga Belskaya and Klara Sabirianova Peter, How Does the Expansion 
of Higher Education Change the Returns to College Quality? Insights from Sixty Years of Russian History (Apr. 
20, 2013), http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/worldb2014/peter_k200.pdf. 
9. Maleshin, supra note 4, at 298; maggs et al., supra note 4, at 185; Shepeleva & Novikova, 
supra note 4, at 111.
10. Dividing law faculties between state and private is only one method of distinguishing 
among them. Maleshin divides them into six categories: national universities, federal 
universities, national research universities, universities, academies, and institutes. See 
generally Maleshin, supra note 4. Moiseeva, by contrast, sets up different categories: classical 
universities, departmental institutions of higher education, or vuzy, specialized legal vuzy, 
other humanitarian vuzy, and technical vuzy. Moiseeva, supra note 2, at 10-13.
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group embraces legal nihilism; both are believers in the power of written law to 
determine the outcomes of court cases. But when presented with compelling 
evidence of political interference in the judicial process, correspondence 
students are more accepting. 
I. Background on Russian Legal Education
About two-thirds of Russian law students attend state-sponsored institutions 
and one-third attend private institutions.11 These private institutions began 
to emerge in the late 1980s and are a fixture of post-Soviet legal education. 
But many of the public purveyors of legal education are also newcomers. 
Some existed under Communism but did not have law faculties. A significant 
number that trained legal specialists in the Soviet era created new branches or 
filialy elsewhere in Russia. Others were created from scratch in the post-Soviet 
era.12 What they all share—both public and private—is an eagerness to capitalize 
on the newfound demand for legal education among Russian young people. 
Some take their mission seriously and have created an infrastructure to attract 
and sustain first-rate scholars and teachers. The Higher School of Economics, 
established by the state in 1992, is a prime example. Although lacking a 
historical pedigree, it is generally regarded as one of the best universities in 
Russia.13 Its law faculty includes many leading legal intellectuals, such as 
Tamara Morshchakova, a retired justice of the Russian Constitutional Court;14 
Sergei Pashin, the architect of judicial reform in the 1990s;15 and Anton Ivanov, 
the former chairman of the now-defunct Higher Arbitrazh Court.16 At the other 
end of the spectrum are many specialized institutes, such as the Russian State 
University of Oil and Gas,17 with storied histories but no prior expertise in 
legal education, that jumped at the chance to increase their student body by 
offering law degrees. Among private universities is likewise a wide spectrum 
that ranges from highly professional to fly-by-night.
In both the public and private realms, the ability to charge tuition was the 
fuel that fired this massive expansion. In the Soviet era higher education was 
11. Moiseeva, supra note 2, at 9-10.
12. See generally maggs et al., supra note 4, at 185; Alexei Trochev, Legal Education in Russia, paper 
delivered at the 7th Conference of the International Society for the Study of European 
Ideas, University of Bergen (Aug. 17, 2000) (paper on file with the author). 
13. See higher school of ecoNomics, https://www.hse.ru/en/ (last visited May 16, 2017).
14. Tamara Morshchakova, higher school of ecoNomics, https://www.hse.ru/org/persons/68773 
(last visited May 16, 2017). 
15. Sergei Pashin, higher school of ecoNomics, https://www.hse.ru/org/persons/6574521 (last 
visited May 16, 2017). 
16. Anton Ivanov, higher school of ecoNomics, https://www.hse.ru/org/persons/68359 (last 
visited May 16, 2017). 
17. See russiaN state uNiversity of oil aNd gas, http://www.gubkin.ru/faculty/law/ (last 
visited May 16, 2017). 
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publicly funded, and the level of funding determined the number of students. 
Increasing the size of the student body at existing law faculties or opening 
new ones was not feasible. This began to change in the late 1980s, thanks to 
Gorbachev’s efforts at economic reform, or perestroika. Creative and persistent 
educators could find their way through the bureaucratic maze to start new 
schools funded by tuition rather than state subsidies. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and its administrative-command economy opened the door to 
the creation of private institutions of higher education. By 1999, the number of 
law faculties had increased to 295, and 143 of these were private.18 
State subsidies persist at public institutions but are no longer the sole 
lifeblood for legal education. The coexistence of these subsidies and tuition 
has given rise to a two-track system for students at state law faculties. About 
18% of these students receive fully funded educations.19 Colloquially, these 
students are said to have “budget” (biudzhetnye) places. The remaining 82% of 
students at state-funded law faculties must pay their own way, as do almost 
all students at private law faculties.20 Unlike the United States, Russia has no 
mechanism for students to obtain loans to finance their education that can be 
paid back after their graduation. Tuition tends to be paid by students’ parents 
or by the students themselves.
Another idiosyncratic feature of Russian legal education is the possibility 
and popularity of studying law via correspondence. Students who pursue this 
path tend to have full-time jobs. They work through course material on their 
own, showing up in person several times a year for intensive sessions that 
include lectures and exams. This so-called zaochnoe education opens up legal 
career paths to Russians who live far from any law faculty, as well as those who 
cannot devote themselves fully to their studies. It originated in the Soviet era, 
when the state was keen to improve the educational qualifications of those who 
staffed legal institutions but could not spare them from their full-time duties.21 
As a general matter, zaochnoe education proved especially popular in the years 
following World War II, as returning soldiers sought to reestablish their places 
in society. Soviet-era data do not specify the share of correspondence students 
by department. By 1960, almost 42% of all students were zaochniki.22 This 
18. Trochev, supra note 12, at 3. 
19. Moiseeva, supra note 2, at 8.
20. Until recently, “budget” places were unavailable at private institutions. This changed in 2010, 
but only marginally. Aggregate national data show that less than 1% of “budget” places went 
to private students in between 2010 and 2013. obrazovaNie v rossiiskoi federatsii: 2013: 
statisticheskii sborNik 363 (2014) [hereinafter obrazovaNie]. For my sample, surveyed in 
2016, 4% of students at private law faculties received these state stipends. 
21. John N. Hazard, Legal Education in the Soviet Union, 1938 wis. l. rev. 562, 566 (1938).
22. NarodNoe khoziaistvo sssr, supra note 3, at 544.
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option has grown more commonplace today. Present-day data confirm that 
over 70% of all Russian law students are zaochniki.23 Because law faculties need 
not provide any facilities for correspondence students, almost all of whom 
pay tuition, administrators have been aggressive in padding these student 
rolls. Many have questioned the quality of the legal education received via 
correspondence, even going so far as to describe this option as a “factory” 
(fabrika) and to argue that it tends to devalue law degrees more generally.24 A 
draft law that would eliminate correspondence education for law has been 
floated, but it has come to naught.25
One last point worth noting about the Russian legal educational 
establishment is that the most prestigious institutions are exclusively public.26 
No functional equivalent yet exists of universities like Harvard, Yale, or 
Stanford in Russia. For the most part, law faculties regarded as elite are 
unchanged from the Soviet era. They include Moscow State University27 and 
St. Petersburg State University, as well as several stand-alone law institutes: 
Ural State Law Academy (Ekaterinburg); Saratov State Law Academy; and 
Moscow State Law Academy, named for O.E. Kutafin. The Higher School of 
Economics, a post-Soviet entrant to the market for legal education in Russia, 
is a new member of this elite group. Although each of these schools has a large 
student body, admission is extremely competitive, especially for the limited 
“budget” places.28 With the exception of St. Petersburg State University, each 
also has a thriving zaochnoe program.29 Many of the newer entrants to the legal 
23. The trend to pursue correspondence education has picked up steam in the post-Soviet era. 
In 2000, 37% of Russian students took this route and, by 2013, it was over 49%. But among 
private students, the trajectory is steeper. The percentage of zaochniki increased from 52 to 81 
from 2000 to 2013. See obrazovaNie, supra note 20, at 363.
24. Ekaterina Moiseeva, Zaochnye iuridicheskie fabriki, vedomosti, (Sept. 23, 2015), https://
www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2015/09/23/609977-zaochnie-yuridicheskie-fabriki 
[hereinafter Zaochnye iuridicheskie fabriki]. For a lively debate on the merits of zaochnoe education, 
see Otmena ‘zaochni’: bor’ba za kachestvo vysshei shkoly ili krest na obrazovanii molodezhi iz regionov? zakoNia 
(July 21, 2016), http://www.zakonia.ru/theme/otmena-zaochki-borba-za-kachestvo-vysshej-
shkoly-ili-krest-na-obrazovanii-molodezhi-iz-regionov-21-07-2016.
25. E.g., Iuristam i ekonomistam poka sokhraniat vozmozhnost’ zaochnogo obucheniia, PPt.ru (Aug. 1, 2016), 
http://ppt.ru/news/136487. 
26. See David L. Konstantinovskiy, Expansion of Higher Education and Consequences for Social Inequality 
(the Case of Russia), 74 higher educ. 201 (2017) [hereinafter Konstantinovskiy, Expansion of 
Higher Education] (rankings for Russian universities). See generally Shepeleva & Novikova, supra 
note 4 (overview of the debates over the quality of legal education within Russia).
27. For example, writing in 1989, Finder characterizes the law faculty at Moscow State University 
as being the “most prestigious Soviet law school.” Finder, supra note 5, at 211.
28. Shepeleva & Novikova, supra note 4, at 109.
29. Until 1987, what is now the Moscow State Law Academy, named for O.E. Kutafin, had only 
correspondence students. It was known as the All-Union Zaochnyi Institute of Law. See 
Zaochnye iuridicheskie fabriki, supra note 24. 
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education market, both public and private, have small programs, sometimes 
with 100 or fewer law students.30 
II. Methodology
To breathe life into this flat institutional picture of Russian legal education, 
I worked with Russian colleagues to organize a survey of law students on the 
cusp of their graduation in spring 2016. Interviewers across Russia 
administered our survey through in-person conversations with 2176 students 
at 163 law faculties. But because the incentive structures for full-time 
and correspondence students are different, we decided to create separate 
representative samples for these two populations. The sample of full-time 
students comprised 1557 respondents and the sample of correspondence 
students comprised 619 respondents. Law faculties were the initial unit 
of analysis. They were stratified by funding source (public or private) and 
then again by elite status. The sample of respondents was distributed in 
proportion to the number of graduates in 2016. When on site at the selected 
law faculties, interviewers used snowball methods to gather respondents. 
Because correspondence students were not regularly on campus, they were 
more difficult to locate, which explains why this sample is smaller. 
These two samples are remarkably different on almost every score, as 
Table 1 documents. Full-time students are more likely to hail from Moscow 
or St. Petersburg, whereas correspondence students tend to come from the 
hinterlands. Almost a third of the full-time students hail from Moscow or St. 
Petersburg, and close to 40% were from other towns in the European part of 
Russia. By contrast, less than 13% of correspondence students are from Russia’s 
two largest cities, and almost 60% are from elsewhere in the European regions 
of Russia. The differences between the portions of these two populations that 
come from Siberia, the Far East, the Urals, and the North Caucasus are less 
striking. It follows that zaochniki are more likely to be from smaller population 
centers than are full-time students. 
Respondents were asked about their family background, their experiences 
as law students, and their post-graduation plans. The survey also included a 
wide range of questions about their knowledge of, and participation in, the 
judicial system, as well as their attitudes toward the courts and other state 
institutions. The encroaching authoritarianism within Russia made querying 
respondents about their political views tricky, but we found proxies for their 
level of support for the Putin regime by seeking out their views of verdicts 
in politically charged cases. Not surprisingly, the willingness to respond 
fluctuated depending on the sensitivity of the underlying question. For 
ordinary questions, less than 2% of respondents refused to respond. When it 
came to questions with political overtones, however, many more sidestepped. 
The refusal rate for such questions was around 15%.
30. Moiseeva, supra note 2, at 4.
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This survey is intended as the first in a series to be fielded every few years 
with these same respondents. The ultimate goal is to understand how Russian 
legal specialists construct their careers, a topic about which we currently know 
very little. But this first survey allows us a revealing glimpse into the lives of 
the respondents as law students.
III. Where Do Russians Study Law?
The divergence between the populations of full-time and correspondence 
students is glaring in their selections of law faculty. As Table 1 reveals, full-
time students are much more likely to attend state schools. Almost 83% made 
this choice. By comparison, a majority of zaochniki attended private schools. 
I found this same effect, but even more pronounced, when exploring who 
attended elite law faculties.31 Whether respondents who ended up at the more 
prestigious state institutions were, in fact, more qualified than those who 
opted for private institutions is unclear from the data. It is possible that they 
were more strategic and/or more knowledgeable when making their decisions 
about where to apply and where to enroll. 
As a rule, Russians tend to stick close to home when selecting a law faculty. 
Once again, the two populations exhibit significant differences. While 63.5% 
of all full-time students attended a law faculty in the same region where their 
parents live, slightly more than three-fourths of all correspondence students 
did so. This finding came as a surprise to me. Zaochniki are not physically tied 
to premises of their law faculty in the same way as their full-time counterparts 
because they do not regularly attend classes. I had expected that, as a result, 
they might be more adventurous in their choices. But to do so, they would have 
to have the resources to travel to these institutions periodically and pay to stay 
nearby. It would also require them to take a leave of absence from their job. By 
sticking closer to home, they save money and can make periodic appearances 
at their workplaces, even during their exam sessions. But all respondents were 
practical when it came to housing. If possible, they continued to live with their 
parents; they did not move into dormitories or find apartments on their own if 
they attended a law faculty in their hometown.32
The opportunity to attend an elite law faculty served as a spur to leave home 
for both groups. Among full-time students, less than half at elite institutions 
had stayed in their home region (compared with 64% for all full-time students). 
This difference is statistically significant (chi2 = 0). The story is less convincing 
for correspondence students. While the percentage of those who stick close 
to home drops from 75 to 66.7 when we factor in attendance at an elite law 
faculty, the difference is not statistically significant (chi2 = 0.265). Of course, 
the numbers are quite small for zaochniki; only thirty attended elite faculties. 
31. Of the 306 respondents who attended elite faculties, 90% were full-time students. Of course, 
when we look at the full population of full-time students, relatively few (about 18%) attended 
elite faculties.
32. On the peculiarities of the Russian housing market, see JaNe r. zavisca, housiNg the New 
russia (2012).
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But these results suggest that, much like their counterparts elsewhere, Russian 
law students flock to educational institutions that they believe will give them a 
leg up in post-graduation connections.33 
Table 1: Summary statistics for surveyed graduating Russian law students 
(unless otherwise indicated, results presented as percentages of each 





Total number: 1557 619
Geographic distribution:
Moscow or St. Petersburg 32.2 12.8
Other European regions 39.9 58.2
Siberia and the Far East 11.7 15.2
Urals 15.5 11.2
North Caucasus 4.7 2.7
Type of legal education:
State 82.8 45.9
Private 17.2 54.1
Attended law faculty in home region: 63.5 75.2
Activities before studying law:
High school 92.1 34.7
Studied in different department 2.1 9.6
Member of workforce 5.8 55.7
Mean age: 22.1 28.1
Both parents are university graduates: 43.6 24.4
Had secured job upon graduation: 30.2 51.2
Family’s financial situation:
Poor: family had trouble covering 
the cost of basic necessities 13.6 16.4
Lower-middle class: family had 
enough money for essentials, but 
had to save for big-ticket items
33.2 45
Higher-middle class: family could 
buy big-ticket items, but not cars 37.7 25.1
33. As a general matter, Konstantinovskiy argues that young people “who are not ‘attached 
to a place’ and are willing (can afford) ‘to move for the quality’ have better life chances.” 
Konstantinovskiy, Expansion of Higher Education, supra note 26, at 18; see generally Dmitrii Ivanov, 
Kuznitsy iuridicheskikh kadrov, kommersaNt (Sept. 9, 2013), https://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2255086.
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Rich: family had no financial 
worries 15.5 13.5
Means of paying for legal education:
State (“budget” place) 35.8 8.3
Parents 55.3 20.5
Self 6.8 69.2
Identifies as ethnic Russian: 81.6 90.5
Religious affiliation of believers: (n = 1495) (n = 604)
Russian Orthodox 70.1 81.1
Muslim 11 7.1
Other 3.5 1.7
Does not belong to established 
religion 15.3 9.9
IV. Who Studies Law in Russia?
A. Demographic Characteristics and Family Background. 
As elsewhere in Europe, Russian legal education is an undergraduate 
enterprise. Lecturing, with little opportunity for student engagement, is the 
primary means of instruction. Pedagogical methods that encourage critical 
thinking are the exception, not the norm. Traditionally, students studied for 
five years and received a specialist degree. In 2003 Russia joined the Bologna 
Process, and legal education has been transitioning to a four-year program 
that awards a bachelor’s degree.34 In either event, students can matriculate in 
their teens and, as a result, most students graduate in their early twenties.35 
A comparison of full-time and correspondence students reveals a chasm. 
Because almost all full-time students (92.1%) proceeded directly from high 
school to the law faculty, the average age for these respondents at graduation 
was twenty-two. The story for correspondence students is more complicated. 
While a third proceeded from high school, over half were returning to 
school from the workforce. Thus, the mean age for zaochniki graduates was 
considerably higher, twenty-eight.36 Interestingly, only about a quarter had 
law-related jobs before enrolling, typically in the criminal justice system or 
34. See generally Maleshin, supra note 4, at 296; Anatoly Kapustin, The Bologna Process: Practical Steps 
for Russian Law Schools, 35 iNt’l J. legal iNfo. 245 (2007) (identifies the background and 
politics of the Bologna process). 
35. Dmitry Maleshin, Chief Editor’s Note on Russian Legal Education, 2 russiaN l.J. 4 (2014) (noting 
that students enter at the ages of 16-17 and graduate approximately four years later). 
36. The age differential is reflected in marital status. Almost 38% of correspondence students are 
married, whereas only about 5% of full-time students have taken this step. 
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the courts. The three-quarters who had jobs in other fields may be trying to 
transition into law or may believe that a university degree will enhance their 
career opportunities. Without exception, correspondence students are seeking 
a degree as a way to move up the workplace ladder. It comes as no surprise 
that a majority of zaochniki had jobs upon graduation, compared with just 30% 
of full-time students. 
Full-time students are more likely to come from families where both parents 
have university degrees (see Table 1). Almost 44% of this group had such 
parents. This suggests that they were brought up with an expectation that 
they would continue on to university. Zaochniki were significantly less likely to 
grow up in that sort of atmosphere. Less than a quarter of them come from 
parents with university education. This advantage extends to having a family 
heritage of practicing law. Although it was not common for either group, full-
time students were almost twice as likely to have a parent who had done legal 
work at some point in his or her career.37
The financial background of respondents sheds further light on the 
differences between these two populations. Full-time students had greater 
resources. A majority saw themselves as upper-middle class or rich; their 
families are easily able to purchase big-ticket items. By contrast, a majority of 
correspondence students described themselves as lower-middle class or poor; 
their families struggle to make ends meet and have to scrimp and save for 
large purchases. Their parents’ jobs also played a role. Students with parents 
from the managerial strata tended to pursue full-time legal education, while 
those with blue-collar parents had a better-than-average chance of being 
correspondence students. Given their more meager family resources, it follows 
that correspondence students were also more likely to have had to work for 
several years to save money for their education. These trends track those 
identified by Russian sociologists of education. They argue that, despite the 
ideology extolling equal educational opportunities for all, which dates back 
to the dawn of the Soviet era, social status, as measured by the educational 
and employment achievements of students’ parents, plays a critical role in 
predicting who will pursue higher education and what road they will take.38 
37. Some 23.3% of full-time students had a parent who had practiced law, while only 12.8% 
of correspondence students had such an advantage. This appears to be a decrease from 
the Soviet era. Some 48% of Moscow law students surveyed in the 1980-81 academic year 
reported having a parent or close relative who also had legal education. See M.A. Fedotov, 
Professional’naia orientatsiia studentov-iuristov (opyt sotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia), PravovedeNie, no. 
3 at 69, 71 (1984). Of course, that high percentage could have been specific to Moscow. 
38. See generally David L. Konstantinovskiy, Social Inequality and Access to Higher Education in Russia, 
47 euroPeaN J. educ. 9, 20-22 (2012). Looking at a broad cross section of graduating high 
school students in Novosibirsk in 2014, he finds that, across the board, over 80% harbored 
a desire to pursue higher education. But the enrollment data documents that their social 
and economic background affected their ability to follow through. While about 61% of the 
children of blue-collar workers attended university, 93% of the children of managers did so. 
Konstantinovskiy, Expansion of Higher Education, supra note 26, at 210-12.
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Not surprisingly, over two-thirds (69.2%) of correspondence students paid 
their own tuition. About a fifth received financial help from their parents. Very 
few—fifty-one respondents, or 8.3%, of all zaochniki—had a “budget” place. The 
story was quite different for full-time students. A majority (55.3%) relied on 
their parents and an additional third were exempt from tuition thanks to state 
stipends. Self-reliance was uncommon, which makes sense given the relative 
youth of the full-time population. Unlike the zaochniki, they would have had 
little opportunity to save for this purpose. The larger irony is inescapable. The 
tuition burden falls more heavily on correspondence students, who, thanks 
to their humbler family origins, are less able to shoulder this load. Indeed, 
these demographic data tend to buttress my earlier point about the informal 
advantages that inure to the benefit of full-time students. These students have 
the benefit of growing up with well-educated and high-achieving parents who 
are more able to shepherd their offspring to prestigious law faculties than are 
the families of correspondence students, who tend to have to make sense of the 
complicated marketplace for legal education on their own.39
For some demographic characteristics, the differences between full-time 
and correspondence students were less striking. For both groups, about two-
thirds were women and one-third were men, and well over 90% saw themselves 
as religious believers.40 But significant differences emerged as to ethnicity and 
religious affiliation. While both samples were dominated by Russians, this 
dominance was more complete among zaochniki, 90% of whom declared their 
ethnicity to be Russian. Fewer full-time students (81.6%) saw themselves as 
Russian. The pattern is similar for religion. About 80% of correspondence 
students identify as Russian Orthodox, compared with 70% of full-time 
students. The probability of being Muslim was greater for full-time students, 
11% of whom embraced Islam, compared with only 7% of zaochniki. 
B. Self-Confidence
As a group, the respondents were remarkably self-confident, with no 
discernable difference between full-time and correspondence students. 
When we asked them to agree or disagree with the statement: “I have a good 
opinion of myself” on a four-point scale, the mean score for both groups was 
3.5, reflecting a strong belief in themselves and their capabilities. This was 
reflected in their response to another statement: “At present, I am generally 
content with my life.” Once again, the mean score of 3.3, shared by full-time 
and correspondence students alike, shows little evidence of the sort of angst or 
self-doubt that often plagues twenty-somethings.
39. This is a familiar story. Lempert estimated that, in the late 1980s, the child of a Leningrad 
lawyer had a hundred times greater chance of being admitted to the law faculty at Leningrad 
State University than did other applicants. lemPert, supra, note 4, at 574. The name of the 
city—St. Petersburg—and the university reverted to their tsarist roots after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. 
40. See Veniamin Simonov, O religioznoi situatsii v Rosii po dannym oprosa 2014 g, vestNik 
obshchestveNNogo mNeNiia, no. 2, at 12 (2015) (overview of religiosity in Russia). 
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We included several questions that are regularly posed on the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey—Higher School of Economics (RLMS-
HSE), a nationally representative survey that has been fielded annually since 
the early 1990s.41 One of these questions asked respondents to imagine a nine-
step ladder and to assess their place on this sort of ladder regarding economic 
and political power. Higher scores reflect a greater sense of power. For each, 
the mean scores of our law student respondents was higher than for the general 
Russian population reflected in the RLMS-HSE data.42 This suggests that, as 
a group, our respondents have yet to be disappointed by life and are optimistic 
about their prospects. 
In a bit of a surprise, the older and more experienced correspondence 
students turn out to be more willing to trust others than are the full-time 
students. When asked to assess the statement “The majority of people can be 
trusted” on a four-point scale, with higher scores indicating a more trusting 
spirit, the mean score for the zaochniki was 2.6, whereas it was 2.4 for full-time 
students. I had expected the correspondence students, who had toiled in 
entry-level jobs, to be more jaded than the fledgling full-time students, but the 
data tell a different story.
V. The Experience of Studying Law in Russia
A. The Choice to Study Law. 
Respondents were asked why they chose to study law. We gave them a list 
of possible goals and asked them to rank each in importance on a four-point 
scale. Higher scores indicated that the named factor was more of a motivating 
force. The rank order of the reasons was the same for both samples. The top 
incentive was becoming rich and successful. Full-time students scored slightly 
higher on this score.43 Perhaps this can be attributed to the hubris of the 
young. For both groups, the next most compelling rationales for studying law 
were providing legal help to people and improving society.44 Interestingly, the 
least important factor for the surveyed Russian law students was pleasing their 
41. See RLMS-HSE: The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, Higher School of Economics, 
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms-hse (last visited May 16, 2017).
42. Here again, the results for full-time and correspondence students were basically the same. 
The mean scores for economic power and political power were 5.1 and 4.8 for the law 
students, and 4.03 and 4.003 for the respondents to the 2015 round of the RLMS-HSE.
43. The mean responses for full-time and correspondence students was 2.46 and 2.25, 
respectively.
44. A similar question was asked of U.S. lawyers as part of the “After the JD” panel survey. In 
the first round, when they were closest to their law school experience, they also put achieving 
success in their careers, both financially and intellectually, in first place. Close behind were 
the desires to help people and improve society. Bryant G. Garth et al., After the JD—Wave 1: 
A Longitudinal Study of Legal Careers in Transition Data Collection: May 2002-May 2003, United States, 




family.45 This may indicate that older generations hold to Soviet-era views of 
working in the legal field as not being terribly prestigious.46
Respondents’ lack of concern on this score should not be taken as an 
indication of their disregard for parental advice. When we asked respondents 
to assess on a four-point scale what factors were most influential in their 
decision to enroll in a law faculty, the advice of their parents and other relatives 
was consistently in first place. Given that the vast majority of full-time students 
are transitioning from high school, it is to be expected that they placed more 
weight on their parents’ opinions than did zaochniki, many of whom are already 
living independent lives.47 The two groups diverge when it comes to the 
second-most important influence. Given that many correspondence students 
were seeking a law degree to get a leg up at their job, the fact that they put 
workplace demands in second place is to be expected. The wet-behind-the-
ears full-time students were less concerned.48 In second place for them was 
the image of lawyers in the media.49 This is, of course, a factor for prospective 
students everywhere and, as with my sample, tends to hold more sway among 
younger cohorts. Given that so many respondents stayed close to home for 
their law studies, it is surprising that neither group placed much emphasis on 
the convenience of the location of their law faculty. Even more unexpected is 
the lack of importance placed on friends who could facilitate their admission. 
Both groups put this factor in last place. This suggests that the introduction of 
a standardized exam—the Unified State Exam—as the key factor for admission 
may have dampened the role of connections.50 Before this innovation, each law 
faculty had its own process, most of which relied heavily on oral exams and 
interviews and provided fertile ground for corruption. 
At the outset of their legal education, almost all the respondents planned 
to work in the legal field. The enthusiasm for practicing law was nearly 
unanimous among full-time students, with 98.7% endorsing this career path. 
45. The lack of concern of present-day students with pleasing their families stands in stark 
contrast to the information we have about motivations for Soviet-era law students. 
According to a 1980-1981 survey, family pressure was the key reason cited by two-thirds of 
those surveyed for choosing to study law. Fedotov, supra note 37, at 71.
46. It was not just law that was devalued. In an effort to inflate the importance of workers and 
peasants, Soviet authorities gave short shrift to all professions. Konstantinovskiy, Expansion 
of Higher Education, supra note 26. 
47. The mean scores for full-time and correspondence students were 2.46 and 2.25, respectively. 
While 52% of full-time students did not live with their parents or the parents of their spouse, 
61% of correspondence students lived on their own. Further evidence is provided by the data 
on children. Almost 40% of zaochniki have children, compared with about 3% of full-time 
students. Age, of course, plays a decisive role with both factors. 
48. The mean responses for full-time and correspondence students were 1.94 and 1.24, 
respectively. 
49. The mean responses for full-time and correspondence students were 2.19 and 1.92, 
respectively. 
50. Cf. Evgeniya Luk’yanova, Russian Educational Reform and the Introduction of the Unified State Exam. A 
View from the Provinces, 64 euroPe-asia stud. 1893 (2012).
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Correspondence students were slightly more circumspect; 95% reported an 
intention to practice law. By the time they were graduating, more had gotten 
cold feet. Among full-time students, 5% had no interest in law-related jobs and 
an additional 12.6% were unsure about their plans. The numbers were greater 
among zaochniki. About 11% said they would not be seeking a law-related job 
and an additional 38% were on the fence. Initially, I thought that zaochniki who 
were working in the legal field as students would be less likely to jump ship, but 
on closer examination, it turns out that this factor was not decisive. Perhaps 
other career opportunities had presented themselves to these correspondence 
students during their time at the law faculty. Or perhaps learning more about 
the legal system left correspondence students more disillusioned than full-
time students. More generally, the percentages of disaffected law students 
seem low among both cohorts. Maleshin, a former vice dean of the law faculty 
at Moscow State University, estimates that only about half the graduates of 
Russian law faculties work as lawyers.51 Thus, my respondents seem unusually 
sanguine about legal practice. It may be that alienation from the law grows 
with experience. This is a question we will address in future rounds of the 
survey. Students who hope to work in the legal field may defect over time, 
either because they cannot find an appropriate job or because they are not 
suited to the work.52 
B. Educational Experiences and Opportunities. 
We asked the surveyed law students to identify their favorite classes. We 
included both traditional courses, such as civil law and criminal law, and 
courses newer to the Russian curriculum, such as property and commercial 
law. Without exception, the respondents clustered around the tried and true. 
Civil law was the most popular, identified as the first choice by over 40% of 
both samples. Criminal law was not far behind, earning the votes of almost 
a third of both samples. The only other class that scored over 5% was civil 
procedure, another traditional element of the curriculum. Newer courses, such 
as land law and tax law, received less than 1% of the votes.53
Experiential learning was a long-standing feature of Soviet legal education 
dating back to the 1930s.54 Upper-level law students were parceled out to 
industrial enterprises, courts, and the criminal justice system to get hands-on 
51. Maleshin, supra note 4, at 296.
52. Scholars of the legal profession elsewhere have found a gendered effect for such defections. 
Whether this will also prove to be the case in Russia remains to be seen. E.g., Ethan 
Michelson, Gender Inequality in the Chinese Legal Profession, in work aNd orgaNizatioNs iN 
chiNa after thirty years of traNsitioN 337 (Lisa Keister, ed., 2009); Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt et al., Men and Women of the Bar: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Gender on Legal Careers, 
16 mich. J. geNder & l. 49 (2009). 
53. There is a certain irony in present-day students’ disdain for newer offerings. In his 1980-1981 
survey of law students, Fedotov found that 72% yearned for less traditional courses, such as 
judicial ethics and rhetoric. Fedotov, supra note 37, at 72.
54. Hazard, supra note 21, at 574.
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training. This sort of on-site internship (stazherovka), which is organized by the 
law faculty for credit, has continued in the post-Soviet era, but the story differs 
for full-time and correspondence students. Only 78.5% of correspondence 
students had had this experience. Those who did not were probably exempt 
because of their ongoing work experience. Over 96% of full-time students had 
completed a stazherovka. The quality of these internships varied. Some students 
were integrated into the routine of the workplace, but many were relegated to 
clerical work. 
On the other hand, law clinics were not part of Soviet legal education.55 
As Russian legal pedagogues began to be exposed to Western practices in 
the 1990s, they grew intrigued by clinical education.56 Initially, many law-
faculty-based clinics were funded by grants from foreign governments and 
foundations. 57 Some lasted only as long as this money held out, but others 
took root. Because clinics, by definition, require active participation, it is not 
surprising that full-time students were more likely to have had this experience. 
Over 28% of full-time students had worked at a clinic, compared with less 
than 12% of zaochniki. Most of these clinics were not specialized; they helped 
all comers. Whether as a result of clinics or stazherovki, about a quarter of both 
samples had court experience by the time they graduated.
Another innovation of post-Soviet legal education is the possibility to 
study abroad. For most of the Soviet period, an undergraduate law student’s 
traveling abroad to study law would have been unthinkable. Indeed, proposing 
it in the Stalinist era might even have been dangerous. The exchanges that 
existed were on the governmental level and were available only to advanced 
graduate students.58 As regulatory oversight diminished and the ever-watchful 
Communist Party receded from power, law faculties began to experiment with 
various types of study-abroad programs.59 Exchanges with Western Europe 
and the United States proved problematic due to the high cost of their tuition 
compared with what Russian students were accustomed to. It was also difficult 
to interest European and American law students in spending extended periods 
in Russia. As a result, studying abroad is the exception, not the rule, for Russian 
55. Some commentators label the stazherovki as clinics, but this is a misnomer. E.g., Finder, supra 
note 5, at 209. They more closely resemble externships.
56. See generally John M. Burman, The Role of Clinical Legal Education in Developing the Rule of Law in 
Russia, 2 wyo. l. rev. 89 (2002); Lawrence M. Grosberg, Clinical Education in Russia: “Da and 
Nyet,” 7 cliNical l. rev. 469 (2000-2001).
57. Mariana Berbec-Rostas et al., Clinical Legal Education in Central and Eastern Europe: Selected Case 
Studies, in the global cliNical movemeNt 53, 63-65 (Frank S. Bloch ed., 2011).  
58. For more information on the background and experiences of the Americans who participated 
in these exchanges, see JohN N. hazard, recollectioNs of a PioNeeriNg sovietologist 
(1984); robert raNd, comrade lawyer: iNside soviet Justice iN aN era of reform 
(1991). 
59. See generally Jane M. Picker & Sidney Picker, Jr., Educating Russia’s Future Lawyers—Any Role for the 
United States?, 33 vaNd. J. traNsNat’l l. 17 (2000).
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law students.60 Given that zaochniki have ongoing work commitments, it stands 
to reason that going abroad for a semester or year was a non-starter for them. 
Only three of the surveyed zaochniki had done so. By contrast, fifty full-time 
students (slightly over 3% of this sample) had participated in study-abroad 
programs, though this percentage was considerably higher for elite schools 
(7.5%), which are more likely to have been courted by Western universities. 
Most (63%) studied in Western Europe.61 The reason for not participating was 
not lack of language facility. Over two-thirds of full-time students, who were 
the likely participants, knew a foreign language. Rather, the most common 
reason was an unawareness of such opportunities.
We asked respondents to reflect on their overall levels of satisfaction with 
two aspects of their legal education: theoretical preparation and practical 
preparation. In his assessment of present-day Russian legal education, 
Maleshin identified skills-based training as a problem area.62 The surveyed 
students agreed. On a four-point scale, in which higher scores indicate greater 
satisfaction, both groups expressed more satisfaction with their theoretical 
training than with their practical training. The attitude toward the former 
was the same for both samples; the mean score for each was 3.3. By contrast, 
correspondence students were more satisfied with their practical training 
(mean = 3.03) than were full-time students (mean = 2.9). Russian colleagues 
who took the zaochnoe road have told me that an advantage of working while 
studying was that they were able to apply what they learned in their jobs. This 
may help explain their more positive attitudes. It also tends to confirm that 
stazherovki are not particularly helpful. Confirming this, Maleshin contends 
that the stazherovki have become a “formality” that “seldom provide skills for 
practical work.”63 He advocates greater reliance on practitioners who can 
imbue students with insights from their day-to-day practice. But he dismisses 
60. During the 1990s, around 150 Russian students came to the United States to study law 
through various U.S.-funded programs. Id. at 67. Informal conversations with representatives 
of the Moscow Fulbright office, who now administer these exchanges, suggest that since 
2000 at least an additional 300 students have studied law in the United States under its 
auspices. Given the rise of the super-wealthy in Russia, it is likely that some oligarchs have 
sent their children abroad to law school. Information about the total numbers studying in 
other countries is not available. 
61. Among the survey respondents, eight went to the United States. Six were full-time students 
and two were correspondence students.
62. Maleshin, supra note 4, at 306. Much like their American counterparts, Russian law firms and 
other prospective employers are frustrated by the inability of law graduates to hit the ground 
running after graduation. Shepeleva and Novikova argue that it is unfair to lay all the blame 
at the doorstep of law faculties, pointing out that the demands of employers have been 
poorly articulated. Shepeleva & Novikova, supra note 4, at 112-13. On a popular legal website, 
experienced Russian legal specialists bemoan the current graduates’ lack of practical skills 
and overall cluelessness. Irina Kondrat’eva, Moglo byt’ khuzhe: iuristy so stazhem—o segodniashnikh 
vypustnikakh iurvuzov, Pravo.ru (Apr. 25, 2015), https://pravo.ru/story/view/139832/. 
63. Maleshin, supra note 4, at 306.
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efforts to date as being “equivalent to extinguishing a fire with a bucket.”64 I 
had expected that clinical experience might make students more positive about 
their practical training, but such an effect is visible only for correspondence 
students.65 The lukewarm attitudes of full-time students toward their practical 
preparedness are the same, regardless of whether they worked at a clinic.
Working while studying law was almost twice as common for correspondence 
students as for full-time students, 79.1% of zaochniki had paying jobs, compared 
with 41.6% of their full-time compatriots. Among both groups, students who 
were paying their own way were more likely to be part of the workforce. Not all 
jobs were law-related. Almost half of correspondence students (47.1%) worked 
in the legal field, compared with two-fifths of full-time students (41.6%). This 
makes sense when we remember that many zaochniki were working in law-
related jobs when they began their legal education. 
VI. The Worldview(s) of Russian Law Students Upon Graduation
A. Attitudes Toward the Russian Legal Profession. 
Turning now to the question of socialization, we asked respondents 
to indicate their level of agreement with five statements about the legal 
profession along a four-point scale. These statements, along with the mean 
responses for full-time and correspondence students, are set forth in Table 2. 
Several of these questions were also posed as part of a 2014 survey of Russian 
advokaty (graduates of law faculties who take a licensing exam)66 organized 
by scholars at the Higher School of Economics and European University.67 
Table 2 presents the mean responses of these advokaty who, in contrast to my 
respondents, have real-life experience in legal practice.
Statements about the moral fiber of lawyers and about their use of 
“loopholes” (lazeiki) in the law elicited the strongest reactions among my 
64. Id. at 290. Interestingly, when practitioners who teach at Russian law faculties are queried 
about their motives, most point to the benefit to themselves or their firms rather than to their 
contribution to enhancing the practical skills of their students. Aleksei Malakhovskii, Kto 
imeet i uchit: pochemu partnery vedushchikh iurfirm idut prepodavat’, Pravo.ru (Apr. 21, 2017), https://
pravo.ru/review/view/139741/. 
65. The mean for correspondence students with clinical experience was 3.19, compared with a 
mean score of 3 for those without this experience (p = 0.08).
66. Like most European countries, Russia has a divided legal profession. In addition to advokaty, 
who tend to be litigation specialists, graduates of Russian law faculties can opt to become 
prosecutors, notaries, business lawyers, judges or government lawyers. See generally maggs et 
al., supra note 4, at 178-233. Advokaty are unique in that they have a monopoly on representing 
criminal defendants. For more on advokaty, see Pamela a. JordaN, defeNdiNg rights iN 
russia: lawyers, the state, aNd legal reform iN the Post-soviet era (2005).
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students, with means above 3. More specifically, respondents endorsed the 
statement “Lawyers make use of loopholes in the law” as well as the statement 
“In their activities, lawyers have high moral standards.” For laypeople, the fact 
that many respondents agreed with both statements might seem inconsistent, 
even schizophrenic. But the sleaziness that nonlawyers associate with using 
loopholes is not always shared by those with legal training. They see their 
task as maximizing the interests of their clients, and consequently, they tend 
to regard loopholes as providing opportunities rather than as compromising 
their principles. 
Table 2: Columns 2 and 3 reflect the agreement of surveyed graduating 
Russian law students with a series of statements about the legal profession 
on a scale of 1 to 4. Column 4 reflects the agreement of advokaty surveyed in 
2014 to these statements (reported as means of each sample where higher 











Lawyers make use of “loopholes” 
in the law. 3.35*** 3.24 2.21
In their activities, lawyers have 
high moral standards. 3.01** 3.1 NA
If a lawyer regularly violates the 
norms of professional conduct, 
then other lawyers should not 
work with him. 
2.9 2.9 3.39
Russians without legal education 
frequently lack trust in lawyers. 2.8 2.8 2.48
A majority of lawyers think more 




Even so, it is worth noting that full-time students are more likely to embrace 
loopholes and to believe that a majority of lawyers think more about their 
income than about their clients. Recall that this group was also more likely to 
have enrolled in a law faculty in search of riches. Perhaps full-time students 
are more cynical than are correspondence students. The fact that zaochniki 
have greater confidence that lawyers have high moral standards buttresses this 
thesis. 
Although Table 2 documents several significant differences in the strength 
of the views of the two samples, it also reveals an overall consistency in the 
ranking of the various statements. This is intriguing, given that Russian 
scholars of legal education have criticized the current curriculum for its lack of 
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emphasis on professional ethics.68 Even so, students emerge with similar views 
on their obligations toward clients. Students feel more strongly about the 
importance of high moral standards than about the need to ostracize errant 
colleagues.
The image of legal ethics that emerges from the responses of the surveyed 
advokaty is intriguingly different. To some extent, this makes sense. My 
respondents are answering as students, whereas the advokaty were no doubt 
reflecting on their experience when answering. In addition, advokaty are 
a specific breed of Russian legal specialist, whose attitudes about taking 
advantage of loopholes may not be shared by others within the legal profession. 
Within my sample, relatively few planned to become advokaty.69 The surveyed 
advokaty were less willing than my student respondents to countenance the 
use of loopholes. Interestingly, the mean for the advokaty was notably lower. 
They were also less forgiving of ethical lapses of colleagues; they were more 
prepared to ostracize lawyers who violate the norms of professional conduct. 
This brief snapshot does not reveal whether the answers of these advokaty are an 
accurate reflection of their experience or are aspirational. Whether the views 
of my respondents will come to resemble those of the surveyed advokaty is a 
question for future surveys. One question that my future surveys will be able 
to answer is whether the views of advokaty on these questions differ from those 
of other legal specialists. This was outside the scope of the 2014 survey.
In a separate battery of questions, we asked respondents to reflect on 
potential constraints to using the courts. They were asked to evaluate the 
extent to which each factor interfered with court use on a four-point scale, with 
higher scores indicating a greater possibility for discouraging use. The issues 
included: filing fees; cost of lawyers; judicial bias; judicial incompetence; 
delays; and implementing decisions. Law students put themselves in the cross 
hairs. They saw the cost of lawyers as being the biggest barrier to going to court. 
The full-time students were more critical (mean = 3.24) than were the zaochniki 
(mean = 3.15). This same set of questions was included in the 2012 round of 
the RLMS-HSE. Like the law students, the larger and more representative 
population of the RLMS-HSE was cowed by the fear of paying lawyers. They 
also put it in first place (mean = 3.19). This suggests that the law students’ 
views were not a result of any socialization during their legal education but 
were absorbed from Russian legal culture.70 
68. E.g., Shepeleva & Novikova, supra note 4, at 118-20. See generally Christopher R. Kelley & Julija 
Kiršienē, The Role of Ethics in Legal Education of Post-Soviet Countries, 8 baltic J. l. & Pol. 139 
(2015).
69. Among full-time students, 12.4% reported a desire to become an advokat, compared with 
8.6% of correspondence students. I explored whether these prospective advokaty had different 
attitudes on these ethical questions. They did not.
70. The fact that the constraints in second and third place were the same for both the law 
students and the RLMS-HSE sample provides further confirmation. In second place was 
fear of difficulty in implementing decisions, and in third place was concern over lawsuits that 
dragged on indefinitely. 
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As for the other factors, the two samples ranked them in the same order. 
The respondents were notably less concerned by them. None earned a mean 
score in excess of 3. Following behind the cost of lawyers were, in order, delays 
in the judicial process, filing fees, and problems with implementing decisions. 
Lagging far behind were doubts about judicial integrity and competence. 
B. Attitudes Toward Law and Courts. 
Legal nihilism is presumed to be rampant among Russians.71 I have elsewhere 
mined the RLMS-HSE data to argue that these rumors are exaggerated.72 
Only 20% of those surveyed in 2012 agreed that a person who thinks a law is 
unfair has the right to “go around” (oboiti) it.73 The willingness to ignore the law 
when it proves inconvenient is most likely to be present among middle-aged 
Russians; it is least evident among young people and pensioners.74 This survey 
of law school graduates tends to support my argument. Respondents were 
asked to indicate their agreement with two statements on a four-point scale. 
The first was the just-referenced sentence about the propriety of bypassing the 
law. The other was, “If officials don’t obey the law, then the rest of Russians 
can do so as well.” For both questions, the mean responses were under 2 for 
both full-time and correspondence students, indicating that well under half of 
those surveyed agreed with the statement. 
Along similar lines, the surveyed students were surprisingly sanguine on 
the question of judicial corruption. Relatively few saw courts as pristine. As to 
those who believed that judges never accept bribes, correspondence students 
emerged as more trusting. Some 15% of them took this position, compared 
with only 10% of full-time students. But over 40% of both groups thought 
bribes were a rarity. Of course, this leaves more than a third who viewed bribes 
as a regular feature of court life. But these law students are infinitely more 
confident in the nobility of the courts than is the Russian general public. In a 
nationally representative survey of Russians fielded in 2017 by the Foundation 
for Public Opinion (“FOM”), a respected Moscow-based polling center, 67% 
believed that judges accept bribes.75 Once again, the power of the socialization 
process of law students is revealed and seems to transcend physical presence 
in the classroom. Few Russian legal educators take a critical stance toward the 
courts, and this attitude is reflected in their students.76
71. When kicking off his presidential campaign in 2008, Dmitry Medvedev claimed that “[w]
ithout exaggeration, Russia is a country of legal nihilism . . . . [N]o other European country 
can boast of such a level of disregard for law.” Polnyi tekst vystupleniia Dmitriia Medvedeva na II 
Grazhdanskom forume v Moskve 22 ianvariia 2008 goda, rossiiskaia gazeta (Jan. 24, 2008). 
72. Kathryn Hendley, Who Are the Legal Nihilists in Russia?, 28 Post-soviet affairs 149 (2012).
73. kathryN heNdley, everyday law iN russia 25 (2017). 
74. Hendley, supra note 72, at 170-79.
75. Reputatsiia sudov i sudei, FOM (Mar. 13, 2017), http://fom.ru/bezopasnost-i-pravo/13239. 
76. E.g., Sahlas & Chastenay, supra note 4, at 209; lemPert, supra note 4, at 717-26.
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Table 3: Attitudes toward judicial independence of surveyed graduating 
Russian law students and respondents in a 2008 nationally representative 











Judges in Russia are 
basically independent 
from representatives of 
federal and local power.
50.1 45.7 19 18
Judges in Russia are 
basically under the 
control of representatives 
of federal and local 
power.
37.8 40.1 59 55
Unwilling to take a 
position. 12.1 14.2 22 27
*The chi2 score for the survey of law students is 0.135. 
**The chi2 score for the INDEM survey is 0.
When they are asked about judicial independence, however, some cracks 
emerge between full-time and correspondence students. As Table 3 shows, both 
groups tended to support the proposition that Russian courts are generally 
independent, though the enthusiasm of that support was more muted among 
correspondence students. Zaochniki were slightly more likely to believe that 
Russian courts are under the control of federal and local officials. They had a 
greater inclination to sit on the fence by refusing to commit themselves to either 
side. But the larger point here is that close to a majority of both populations of 
surveyed law students believe in the independence of their courts. 
The confidence of the surveyed law students in the independence of Russian 
courts is not matched by the general public. The question we asked mirrors 
one that was included in a 2008 survey fielded by INDEM to a representative 
sample of Russians.77 As Table 3 indicates, Russians are less optimistic than 
my students. Less than 20% trusted in the independence of their courts. The 
vast majority—59%—believed judges are under the thumb of governmental 
officials.78 When I recalculate the responses to include only people born 
after 1988, to eliminate the possibility of a generational bias, the results are 
basically the same. Thus it would seem that, regarding this question, their 
legal education has had a profound impact on the surveyed law students. They 
are much more willing to give courts the benefit of the doubt.
77. INDEM, an abbreviation for Information Science for Democracy, is an independent 
Moscow policy institute. See generally INDEM, http://www.indem.ru/russian.asp (last visited 
May 16, 2017).
78. A.K. Gorbuz, M.A. Krasnov, E.A. Mishina, & S.A. Satarov, Transformatsiaa rossiiskoi sudebnoi 
vlasti. Opyt kompleksnogo analiza 391 (2010).
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Greater differences between full-time and correspondence students 
emerged as the questions got more specific. We asked respondents to assess the 
importance on a four-point scale of various factors to judges as they make their 
decisions. We distinguished between civil and criminal cases. Higher scores 
indicate that respondents saw the factor as more critical in shaping judicial 
thinking. The results are reported in Table 4. What immediately stands out is 
the importance assigned to governing law across the board. This may surprise 
those whose impressions of Russian courts are grounded in media reports, 
which tend to paint a picture of a process in which the law on the books is 
largely irrelevant.79 Both the Western and Russian media focus primarily on 
high-profile cases with political resonance in which the results are predictably 
in line with Kremlin preferences and have little to do with the merits of the 
case or the law itself. These outcomes are often presumed to be dictated by 
powerful and shadowy figures with immense political and/or economic power, 
a process derisively labeled as “telephone law.”80 In reality, however, such 
cases represent the proverbial drop in the bucket. My years of ethnographic 
research in the Russian courts leave me convinced that, if anything, when 
handling routine (nonpolitical) cases, Russian judges tend to err on the side of 
overemphasizing the written law rather than ignoring it.81 This positivism is not 
learned on the bench but is inculcated in law faculties. Russian law professors 
and their Soviet predecessors emphasize the text of the codes when teaching.82 
Thus it is hardly surprising that all respondents—full-time and correspondence 
students alike—rank governing legislation as the most important influence on 
judges as they resolve disputes.83 Their strong feelings persist across both civil 
and criminal cases. Table 4 reveals that full-time students regard the law on 
the books as more important for judges than do zaochniki. This may reflect the 
impact of regular lectures as opposed to self-study. 
79. In 2011, reporters from The New York Times won a Pulitzer Prize for their “Above the Law” 
series of articles about the dysfunction of Russian courts. Above-the-Law, N.y. times, http://
topics.nytimes.com/top/news/world/series/abovethelaw/index.html (last visited may 16, 
2017). 
80. See Alena Ledeneva, Telephone Justice in Russia, 24 Post-soviet affairs 324 (2008).
81. See generally heNdley, everyday law iN russia, supra note 73.
82. Sahlas & Chastenay, supra note 4, at 209. 
83. The 2017 FOM survey asked a similar question of the general public. Ordinary Russians also 
ranked written law (zakony) as the most important factor guiding judges in their decision-
making. Reputatsiia sudov i sudei, supra note 75. In a 2014 FOM survey, 91% agreed that it was 
essential for ordinary Russians to know the law themselves, though only 16% believed 
that, in fact, they and those close to them actually knew the law well. Znanie zakonov, FOM 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://fom.ru/Bezopasnost-i-pravo/11844. That they could simultaneously 
believe in the power of law and the predominance of “telephone law” represents the sort of 
inconsistency or compartmentalization in their thinking about law that I have written about 
elsewhere. See generally heNdley, everyday law iN russia, supra note 73, at 1-15; Kathryn 
Hendley, Resisting Multiple Narratives of Law in Transition Countries: Russia and Beyond, 40 l. & soc. 
iNquiry 531 (2015).
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Table 4: Assessment by surveyed graduating Russian law students of the 
influence of various factors on judicial decision-making on a scale of 1 to 
4 (reported as means of each sample where higher scores reflect greater 
influence).










legislation  3.79*** 3.64 3.82*** 3.76
Parties’ arguments 3.48*** 3.36 3.47 3.43
Complying with 
statutory deadline 2.92 2.87 2.75** 2.65
Court chairman’s 
preference 2.24*** 2.37 2.31** 2.4
Parties’ financial 
connections 2.196* 2.27 2.17 2.2
Parties’ political 
connections 2.16** 2.25 2.18 2.19
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
But the evidence is mixed as to which group gives more credence to concerns 
of “law in action” over the “law on the books” that is emphasized in Russian 
legal education. On the one hand, Table 4 documents that full-time students 
are more likely to believe that judges are motivated by bureaucratic incentives 
in their day-to-day activities. As most Russian law students are probably aware, 
one of the key criteria in the ongoing assessment of judges is the percentage of 
cases that violate statutory deadlines for resolution. In my countless interviews 
with Russian judges over the past two decades, I have yet to encounter any 
who do not worry about their statistics on delays.84 Maintaining low numbers 
is critical for staying in the good graces of their superiors and for rising to 
higher-level courts. Striving to do so gives rise to risk-averse behavior by judges 
that includes a reluctance to veer from the written law, even when justice might 
seem to demand it. These are insights that I have gleaned from fieldwork, not 
from the doctrinal articles that fill Russian law reviews. On this score, full-time 
students seem more willing to look past the formal version of how the system 
works. 
On the other hand, as for the influence of court chairmen, correspondence 
students seem more in tune with reality. Many scholars have argued that Russian 
judges adjust their decisions to reflect the preferences of the chairmen of their 
courts.85 This makes more sense when we remember that these chairmen act as 
84. See generally heNdley, everyday law iN russia, supra note 73, at 154-78.
85. E.g., Vadim Volkov & Aryna Dzmitryieva, Recruitment Patterns, Gender, and Professional Subcultures 
of the Judiciary in Russia, 22 iNt’l J. legal Prof. 166 (2015); Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Informal 
Practices in Russian Justice: Probing the Limits of Post-Soviet Reform, in russia, euroPe, aNd the rule 
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court managers. They often assign cases. A quiet word from a chairman can 
ensure or derail a desired promotion. Put more bluntly, chairmen can make 
or break the judges under their purview. Zaochniki were more suspicious that 
judges are dancing to the tune of their chairmen.
More pernicious than these institutional factors are blatantly extralegal 
influences, such as the political and economic connections of the parties. This 
sort of “telephone law” is always officially denied, but many Russians suspect 
that it lingers in the background; they never know when it will rear its head.86 
As part of the battery of questions about influences on judicial decision-
making, we asked separately about the role of political connections and 
wealth. Interestingly, the surveyed students saw political connections, which 
are the lifeblood of “telephone law,” as being the least important influence on 
judicial decision-making. They likewise gave short shrift to the role of money, 
viewing it as slightly more important than political ties, but ranking it far 
behind governing law or the arguments of litigants. Correspondence students 
were more troubled than were full-time students about both financial and 
political connections. This provides compelling, though still not conclusive, 
evidence that zaochniki are more savvy than full-time students. The extent to 
which the lesser importance placed on connections reflects respondents’ own 
deeply held views or what they learned at the feet of their professors, whose 
strict adherence to doctrinally based pedagogy would leave little room for 
discussions of realpolitik, is unclear. It is also possible that their unwillingness 
to believe that judges are guided by the wealth or political power of those who 
appear before them reflects the naiveté of the young. On the other hand, the 
fact that respondents with hands-on court experience tend to view connections 
as significantly less potent influences on judges87 suggests that observing the 
day-to-day reality of Russian courtrooms disabuses young people of any belief 
in outside factors. By contrast, those without such experience are captives of 
the myths that animate the media. 
C. Attitudes Toward the State. 
The qualitative difference in the political attitudes of full-time and 
correspondence students comes into clearer focus as we explore respondents’ 
attitudes toward recent cases with political overtones. We asked them to indicate 
their level of support for the verdicts. Table 5 lays out the mean responses for 
the criminal cases involving Mikhail Khodorkovskii, Aleksei Naval’nyi, and 
of law 79, 82-86 (Ferdinand J.M. Feldbrugge ed., 2007); aleNa ledeNeva, caN russia 
moderNise? sistema, Power Networks aNd iNformal goverNaNce 151-57 (2013).
86. See generally ledeNeva, supra note 85; aNNa Politkovskaya, PutiN’s russia (2014). 
87. This effect is evident regarding financial connections in civil cases. For full-time students, 
the mean scores for those with and without court experience were 2.08 and 2.23, respectively 
(p = 0.004). For correspondence students, these respective mean scores were 2.11 and 2.45 
(p = 0.005). With criminal cases, the effect is visible only among correspondence students. 
The mean for those with court experience is 2.06, compared with a mean of 2.25 for those 
without such experience (p = 0.026). Having court experience has no discernable effect on 
respondents’ attitudes toward the role of political connections. 
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the members of Pussy Riot. Higher scores reflect more support for the guilty 
verdicts issued against all these defendants. Others have analyzed the merits 
of these cases in great detail.88 For our purposes, what is interesting is the 
unmistakable propensity for zaochniki to be more supportive of these verdicts. 
Given the sympathy for these defendants in the Western media, it might be 
assumed that the correspondence students are bucking public opinion in their 
strong support for the verdicts. In reality, however, the Russian public shares 
their view; it has little use for modern-day dissidents (just as it was hostile to 
Soviet-era dissidents).89 Take the case of Khodorkovskii, who at the time of 
his arrest was the CEO of Yukos, one of Russia’s largest oil companies; even 
though almost half of those surveyed by the Levada Center, a reputable Russian 
polling firm,90 believed that Khodorkovsky was in jail because he refused to 
go along (ne dogovorilsia) with the Kremlin, and almost as many believed that 
the Kremlin pressured the court to obtain the guilty verdict,91 less than 5% felt 
sympathy for him.92 Khodorkovskii, who was released from prison on the eve 
of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, now lives in exile.93 His conviction dates back 
to 2005, and so his story might be a bit remote for these twenty-something 
respondents. But Aleksei Naval’nyi is active on the present-day political stage. 
His first conviction came in 2013.94 Undaunted, he ran for mayor of Moscow 
later that year, surprising the Kremlin by receiving over 20% of the vote.95 
He was a key mover behind the March 2017 protests against governmental 
88. E.g., richard sakwa, the quality of freedom: khodorkovsky, PutiN, aNd the yukos 
affair (2009); Jussi Lassila, Aleksei Naval’nyi and Populist Re-ordering of Putin’s Stability, 68 euroPe-
asia stud. 118 (2016); masha gesseN, words will break cemeNt: the PassioN of Pussy 
riot (2014).
89. E.g., ludmilla alexeyeva, soviet disseNt: coNtemPorary movemeNts for NatioNal, 
religious, aNd humaN rights (1985).
90. levada ceNter, http://www.levada.ru/en/about-us/ (last visited May 16, 2017). 
91. Rossiiane o presledovanii kompanii Iukos i M. Khodorkovskogo, levada ceNter (Sept. 18, 2006), http://
www.levada.ru/2006/09/18/rossiyane-o-presledovanii-kompanii-yukos-i-m-hodorkovskogo/.
92. This lack of sympathy for Khodorkovskii was consistent from 2004 through 2011. 
O pomilovanii Khodorkovskogo, levada ceNter (Apr. 3, 2011), http://www.levada.
ru/2011/04/03/o-pomilovanii-hodorkovskogo-2/.
93. Khodorkovskii funds an opposition NGO, Open Russia, that works to promote civil society 
in Russia. oPeN russia, https://www.khodorkovsky.com/programmes/open-russia/ (last 
visited May 16, 2017).
94. Naval’nyi received a suspended sentence in 2013. He was tried again in 2017 for defrauding 
a lumber company and was, again, convicted. These criminal convictions barred him from 
running for President in 2018. See Neil MacFarquhar & Ivan Nechepurenko, Aleksei Navalny, 
Viable Putin Rival, Is Barred from a Presidential Run, N.y. times (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/02/08/world/europe/russia-aleksei-navalny-putin.html.
95. Paul Roderick Gregory, Moscow Mayor’s Election: So Much for Competitiveness, 
Transparency, and Legitimacy, forbes (Sept. 8, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
paulroderickgregory/2013/09/08/moscow-mayors-election-so-much-for-competitiveness-
transparency-and-legitimacy/#51f25eb01d3b. 
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corruption in Moscow.96 Beloved as he may be by Western liberals and 
Moscow intellectuals, ordinary Russians are more skeptical. When the Levada 
Center asked them in 2015 what word they associated with Naval’nyi, only 5% 
picked “respect.” More opted for the words “dislike” (8%) and “irritation” 
(8%). Over 20% said that they could say nothing good about him.97 Thus, 
the fact that 34% of correspondence students found the guilty verdict in his 
case completely fair and an additional 38% thought it was somewhat fair is not 
surprising, nor does it mark them as out of step with the rest of the Russian 
general public.
Readers who do not follow Russian developments closely may find the 
respondents’ strong support for the guilty verdicts in the criminal case against 
the members of Pussy Riot unexpected. These young women, who were also 
released from prison on the eve of the Sochi Olympics, have become the 
darlings of the Western media, even appearing in an episode of Netflix’s 
“House of Cards.”98 They came to public attention through a series of 
provocative punk rock videos and were arrested for an anti-Putin protest 
at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.99 I had thought that the youthfulness 
of the respondents would give them more sympathy for Pussy Riot. But 
my respondents have chosen a much more traditional career path than the 
members of Pussy Riot, none of whom found a welcoming home in Russian 
higher education. They are, at heart, anarchists, which makes them almost the 
mirror image of law students. The respondents’ distaste for Pussy Riot, which 
is reflected in their support for what was a blatantly manipulated verdict, 
echoes Russian society’s views. When the Levada Center surveyed ordinary 
Russians during the band’s trial in August 2012, asking them what words they 
associated with the group, less than 1% chose “respect.” As compared with 
Naval’nyi, more picked the words “dislike” (14%) and irritation (17%).100 In a 
May 2013 survey, 56% characterized the sentence of two years’ imprisonment 
as “adequate,” while 26% saw it as “extreme.” Only 9% argued that Pussy 
Riot’s actions did not deserve criminal punishment.101 My respondents were 
of a like mind. Less than 10% of both samples saw the verdict as completely 
unfair. Perhaps Pussy Riot’s choice to demonstrate on the altar of a venerated 
96. Neil MacFarquhar & Ivan Nechepurenko, Aleksei Navalny, Russian Opposition Leader, Receives 
15-Day Sentence, N.y. times (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/world/
europe/aleksei-navalny-russia-prison-sentence.html. 
97. Rossiiane ob Aleksee Naval’nom, levada ceNter (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.levada.ru/05-02-2015/
rossiyane-ob-aleksee-navalnom. 
98. Jason Guerrasio, Pussy Riot Makes a Bold Cameo in “House of Cards” Season 3, busiNess iNsider 
(Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/house-of-cards-pussy-riot-2015-3. 
99. The Original Video of Performance Punk Band Free Pussy Riot in Cathedral of Christ th[e] Saviour Moscow, 
youtube (Aug. 6, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PN5inCayfnM. 
100. Tret’ rossiian verit v chestnyi sud nad Pussy Riot, levada ceNter (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.
levada.ru/2012/08/17/tret-rossiyan-verit-v-chestnyj-sud-nad-pussy-riot/. 
101. The remaining 9% took no position. Rossiiane o Pussy Riot i tserkvi, levada ceNter (May 20, 
2013), http://www.levada.ru/20-05-2013/rossiyane-o-pussy-riot-i-tserkvi. 
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cathedral touched a nerve among young people, including my respondents, 
much as it did among older generations.102 
Table 5: Support of surveyed graduating Russian law students for verdicts 
(convictions) in politicized cases on a scale of 1 to 4 (reported as means of 
each sample where higher scores reflect greater support).
Name of defendant Full-time students Correspondence students
Pussy Riot 2.99 3.14
Mikhail Khodorkovskii 2.87** 3.02
Aleksei Naval’nyi 2.82** 2.99
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Support for the verdicts in these three politicized cases can be seen as an 
endorsement of the Putin regime and its creeping authoritarianism. Arguably, 
a more straightforward proxy for respondents’ views on Putin is their reaction 
to the merger between the Russian Supreme Court and the Higher Arbitrazh 
Court. A few words of background are needed to put this change into context. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, post-Soviet Russia had 
two hierarchies of courts, as well as a stand-alone Constitutional Court.103 The 
vast majority of disputes, including all criminal cases, were heard by the courts 
of general jurisdiction.104 For them, the Supreme Court was the court of last 
resort. The introduction of market incentives gave rise to economic disputes 
between private firms. A new set of courts, known as arbitrazh courts, was 
created to handle these cases, and the Higher Arbitrazh Court stood at the apex 
of this hierarchy.105 In June 2013, Putin proposed combining the two top courts. 
Doing so required amending the constitution, but his virtual control over the 
political landscape (both federal and regional) made this easy. The reasons 
for the merger remain obscure. The business bar, which had grown to respect 
the expertise of the Higher Arbitrazh Court, opposed it, but to no avail.106 By 
September 2014, the Higher Arbitrazh Court was only an institutional memory. 
102. For a review of the Russian press coverage of Pussy Riot, see Volha Kananovich, Progressive 
Artists, Political Martyrs, or Blasphemous Hussies? A Content Analysis of the Russian Media Coverage of the 
Pussy Riot Affair, 39 PoPular music & soc. 396 (2016).
103. See generally alexei trochev, JudgiNg russia: coNstitutioNal court iN russiaN Politics, 
1990-2006 (2008).
104. See generally Peter h. solomoN, Jr. & todd foglesoNg, courts aNd traNsitioN iN russia: 
the challeNge of Judicial reform (2000).
105. Kathryn Hendley, Remaking an Institution: The Transition in Russia from State Arbitrazh to Arbitrazh 
Courts, 46 am. J. comP. l. 93, 94, 118-19 (1998). 
106. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., The Unexpected Demise of Russia’s High Court and the Politicization of Judicial 
Reform, russiaN aNalytical dig., no. 147 at 2-4 (2014).
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Because the merger was so closely associated with Putin, attitudes toward 
it provide a window into respondents’ support for him and his policies. Once 
again, the two samples diverge. The results are somewhat confounding. As 
Table 6 illustrates, full-time students are not only more likely to support the 
merger, but also more likely to oppose it. This is possible only because 35% 
of correspondence students did not express a firm opinion. Twenty percent 
of these zaochniki claimed to be unaware of the merger, and an additional 15% 
refused to answer. Whether this reticence reflects a wariness about the political 
implications of the question or genuine ignorance is unclear. I suspect they 
were unaware of the merger. After all, they did not shy away from sharing 
their views of high-profile cases; such questions are more flagrantly political. 
Because correspondence students exist mostly in their own bubbles and are 
not part of a live student body, they may be less engaged with current events. 
Surely keeping up with their workplace duties and their coursework, not to 
speak of family obligations, must leave them with little spare time. Full-time 
students, by contrast, have fewer outside distractions. It makes sense that less 
than 8% professed ignorance. 
Looking past these non-response categories, Table 6 shows that a majority 
of full-time students supported Putin’s decision to phase out the Higher 
Arbitrazh Court in favor of an all-inclusive Supreme Court, as compared 
with 45% of correspondence students.107 This consolidation was driven by 
politics, not by institutional need, and consequently can be interpreted as a 
challenge to Russian judicial independence. The stronger endorsement by 
full-time students is difficult to square with the fact that a majority of full-time 
students believe that judges are capable of resisting entreaties from federal 
and local officials. Perhaps they distinguish between institutional reform and 
interference in specific cases. As their muted enthusiasm for the verdicts in 
recent political cases indicates, they are uncomfortable with the latter. But 
they may see reconfiguring the jurisdictional boundaries of the top appellate 
courts as within the purview of the executive branch. Indeed, they may not 
view the reorganization as political. After all, while Putin instigated the reform 
process, authorities followed the implementation process laid out in Russian 
legislation and constitution. Having grown up in a Putin-centric political 
climate, they probably took the rubber-stamped approval of the change at 
the national and regional levels as normal and entirely legal. Their relative 
youth might also have blinded them to the implications of giving the executive 
branch carte blanche to restructure the courts. 
107. Amid the process of changing the constitution to allow the merger, the Levada Center polled 
ordinary Russians on their views. A majority (51%) took no position, probably because they 
were unaware of the details of the plan. The remainder were evenly divided between pro and 
con. Ob”edinenie Verkhovnogo i Vysshego arbitrazhnogo sudov, levada ceNter (Nov. 27, 2013), http://
www.levada.ru/2013/11/27/obedinenie-verhovnogo-i-vysshego-arbitrazhnogo-sudov/.
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Table 6: Responses of surveyed graduating Russian law students to the 
question “Did you support the consolidation of the Higher Arbitrazh Court 
with the Supreme Court?” (reported as percentages of each sample).
Full-time students Correspondence students
Yes 51 45.1
No 30.1 19.9
I do not know about this 7.8 19.4
Refuse to respond 11.1 15.6
Chi 2 = 0
VII. Assessing the Differences Between Full-Time and Correspondence 
Students: Pragmatism vs. Idealism
The thinking of the surveyed Russian law students is messy. To some 
extent, full-time and correspondence students had a similar worldview, despite 
their disparate origins. They shared a sense of hopefulness, both about the 
legal system and about life in general. But when it comes to their attitudes 
toward the state and its possible encroachment into the judicial sphere, the 
results suggest a basic divide between full-time and correspondence students. 
The former tended to be more idealistic whereas the latter tended to be more 
pragmatic. 
The pragmatism of zaochniki is evident in several realms. When asked about 
the potential influences on judicial decision-making, they were quicker to 
acknowledge the insidious pressures on judges to resolve cases in a way that 
pleases their chairmen (see Table 4). This reflects a realistic attitude about how 
the world works. This same sense of realism explains their higher approval 
ratings for the guilty verdicts in the Pussy Riot, Khodorkovskii, and Naval’nyi 
cases (see Table 5). It may be that many of them wish that the system operated 
differently—that judges would be unaffected by mundane concerns like 
staying in the good graces of their superiors—but they recognize that they are 
powerless to effect change. Recall that the correspondence students are older 
and more experienced in the day-to-day realities of workplace life (see Table 1). 
Also relevant are their class origins. The fact that most them have had to work 
harder for everything they have than have full-time students seems to have left 
them unwilling to challenge the status quo, even when that means accepting 
the role of extralegal factors in the courts, both in theory and in practice. When 
queried about Putin’s usurpation of the power of the Higher Arbitrazh Court, 
correspondence students hesitated to commit themselves, providing further 
evidence of their risk-averse nature.
Full-time students, by contrast, were younger and more willing to believe 
that the legal system operates as it is supposed to. They had less real-life 
experience to teach them about the compromises, both moral and practical, 
with which Russian judges wrestle. Absent that, they held tightly on to what 
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they learned in the classroom. They were surer of the independence of the 
judiciary (see Table 3). Put more simply, full-time students were more invested 
in the textbook version of how courts work. Regarding both civil and criminal 
cases, they had a stronger belief in the determinative role of the governing law 
and the arguments made by the parties in court. Full-time students were more 
resistant to the idea that judges’ heads can be turned by the wealth or political 
connections of the parties or by their own desire to get ahead (see Table 4). 
They were also less likely to look behind the superficial legality of Russian 
life. They took the consolidation of the Higher Arbitrazh Court at face value, 
not questioning its appropriateness. This may be a result of the emphasis on 
doctrinal learning at the expense of critical thinking in Russian law faculties.
On the other hand, neither group is a perfect reflection of either pragmatism 
or idealism. Like all of us, the surveyed students were not entirely consistent 
in their beliefs. We would expect that the noble-minded full-time students 
would be more likely to believe that lawyers should have high moral values. 
And, by the same token, the hardheaded correspondence students ought to be 
more likely to believe that most lawyers are more concerned with their income 
than with protecting their clients. Yet in both cases, the results, as laid out 
in Table 2, confound our expectations. Likewise, the suspicion that concerns 
over meeting temporal statutory deadlines, which was greater among full-
time students than correspondence students, betrayed a streak of pragmatism 
among the usually idealistic full-time students (see Table 4). This serves to 
remind us that idealism and pragmatism exist along a spectrum; how each is 
manifested is not always predictable. 
As a result, it stands to reason that full-time and correspondence students 
share certain core beliefs that are doubtless the result of a shared socialization 
process that undergirds Russian legal education. The survey results indicate 
that this inculcation of values extends to all students; traditional classroom 
instruction is not required. As compared with the general public, the surveyed 
law students are more confident of the capacity of the courts to resist outside 
pressures, whether formal or informal. Like lay people from their generation, 
they are not terribly nihilistic. Rather, they are optimistic about the capacity of 
law to constrain power. It is also striking that when asked about their attitudes 
toward professional ethics, the two groups rank the various factors identically 
(even though their intensity of feeling varies) (see Table 2). The same is true 
for their views on the forces that shape judicial thinking (see Table 4). 
Future surveys will reveal the extent to which pursuing full-time or 
correspondence legal education has a sustained effect on the thinking and 
career choices of the graduates of Russian law faculties.
